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SECURED BAD DEBTS: MANIPULATION OF DEDUCTIONS
BY POSTPONING LIQUIDATION OF SECURITY*
THE Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for a loss resulting when a
debt owing to a taxpayer becomes worthless within the taxable year.' Business
bad debts are fully deductible from ordinary income,2 and deductions are per-
mitted for partial worthlessness.3 On the other hand, nonbusiness bad debts
are deductible only as short term capital losses, 4 and deductions for partial
worthlessness are not allowed.5 The tax effect of security on a debt that would
*Loewi v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1956).
1. "There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes worthless within
the taxable year." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(a) (1).
There can be no bad debt deduction without a valid debt. Harmount v. Commissioner,
58 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1932) ; Tye, Pointers in Bad Debts, Worthless Securities and Other
Business Losses, N.Y.U. SIXTH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 681, 682 (1948). The debt must have
had value when acquired; a "loan" cannot be deducted if when made there was no expecta-
tion of repayment either because it was a contribution to capital, American Cigar Co. v.
Commissioner, 66 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 3 T.C. 1233
(1944), or because the creditor intended to make a gift, Young, Inc. v. Commissioner, 120
F.2d 159 (1st Cir. 1941) ; Estate of Carr V. Van Anda, 12 T.C. 1158 (1949), aff'd, 192
F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1951).
Unless unpaid rent, wages, salary, etc. have been included as income by the creditor
they cannot later be deducted as bad debts. See, e.g., John L. Seymour, 14 T.C. 1111
(1950) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k)-2 (1951).
Losses, deductible under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165, and bad debts are mutually
exclusive. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(a)-(c) substantially follows the bad debt provisions
under the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(k) (1)-(6), as amended, 56 STAT. 820-22 (1942)
and 58 STAT. 35 (1944). For the purpose of this discussion the same result would be
reached under either statute.
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(a) (1). Unused deductions may be applied as net
operating loss carrybacks and carryovers. Id. § 172.
3. "When satisfied that a debt is recoverable only in part, the Secretary or his delegate
may allow such debt, in an amount -not in excess of the part charged off within the taxable
year, as a deduction." Id. § 166 (a) (2).
A taxpayer may, but need not, deduct for partial worthlessness in each year that some
partial worthlessness develops. He may also wait until further worthlessness occurs, and
deduct the total accumulated partial worthlessness at that date, or he may wait until the
debt is completely worthless. E. Richard Meinig Co., 9 T.C. 976 (1947); Moock Elec.
Supply Co., 41 B.T.A. 1209 (1940) ; G.C.M. 18525, 1937-1 Cux. BuLI 80.
A charge-off, which is a reduction in valuation of the asset on the taxpayer's books,
must be established for a partial deduction. Trinco Industries, Inc., 22 T.C. 959 (1954).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(d) (1) (B). Short term capital losses can be offset
fully against capital gains, but against ordinary income only to the extent of $1,000. Id.
§ 1211 (b). Capital losses may be carried forward for five years subject to the limitations
in id. § 1212.
For a discussion of the distinction between business and nonbusiness debts see Guter-
man, Some Problems in the Deduction for Bad Debts, 63 HARV. L. REv. 832 (1950).
5. INT. ReV. CoDEOF 1954, § 166(d) (1) (A).
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otherwise be uncollectible is not mentioned by the Code.6 Nor has recent case
law answered the question whether such a debt becomes "worthless" within
the meaning of the Code so long as the security remains unliquidated.
7
In the case of Loewi v. Ryan 8 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
permitted a taxpayer to deduct a nonbusiness bad debt in the year she liqui-
dated her security, although apart from the collateral, the debt was uncollect-
ible many years earlier, and liquidation was postponed solely for tax purposes.
The taxpayer had made a $450,000 loan to her brother in 1929 which was re-
payable on demand.9 The debt was eventually secured by shares of corporate
stock and a one-half interest in a New York Stock Exchange seat. The debtor
never repaid any of the loan, and the taxpayer admitted she knew as early as
1937 that, apart from the collateral, the debtor had no assets of any conse-
quence.' 0 In 1943 most of the stock was sold, the proceeds of approximately
$20,000 applied in reduction of the indebtedness, and in 1944 the remainder
of the collateral, including the interest in the Stock Exchange seat, was sold
for about $14,000.11 The taxpayer claimed that in 1944 the debt became en-
tirely worthless and entitled her to a deduction that year of $416,000. The
Commissioner disallowed the deduction because the taxpayer avoided liquida-
tion of the collateral until 1944 solely for the reason that from 1938 to 1943
her capital gains were not sufficient to permit substantial utilization of the bad
debt deduction. 12 He considered that the taxpayer had no privilege to post-
6. The purpose of security is to secure performance of an obligation. There are two
classes, collateral or property security, and personal security. By collateral security is
meant any property, negotiable stock or bonds, or documentary evidence of a claim against,
or ownership in, property that is conveyed to the creditor as a pledge for the repayment of
money lent, or as a guarantee for the performance of a contract. By personal security is
meant a guaranty of the payment of money by one person for another. Personal security
consists of a guarantor's promise alone; there is no pledge of his property. MUNN, EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 726 (1937).
7. Compare Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1953), and
Marcus Boyd, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 293 (1945) (prevents total worthlessness), with
Leopold Spingarn, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 498 (1948) (debt worthless).
8. 229 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1956), reversing 55-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9445 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
9. Actually Mrs. Loewi loaned her brother $350,000, and her husband loaned him a
one-quarter interest in a seat on the New York Stock Exchange which they valued at
$100,000. Loewi v. Ryan, 55-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9445 at 55,087 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The bad debt
deduction was claimed by both Mr. and Mrs. Loewi, who had filed a joint income return
for 1944. The courts treated the two loans as one debt in deciding the legal questions. Ibid.;
Loewi v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1956).
10. Brief for Appellees, app. p. 3a, Loewi v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1956).
11. Brief for Appellants, p. 5, Loewi v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1956).
12. The Commissioner pointed out that in 1938, when the Loewis released the brother's
obligation, they had net taxable capital gains of $8,115.87, that in each of the years 1939
through 1.943 $13,000 was the maximum of their net taxable capital gains, but that for 1944
the Loewis had net taxable capital gains of $84,128.26. Brief for Appellees, p. 7, Loewi v.
Ryan, 229 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1956). However, for the years 1938-41 the Commissioner
should have presented figures representing the net taxable income, rather than the net tax-




pone liquidation for tax purposes alone. This position was upheld in a district
court when the taxpayer sued for a refund.13 But the Second Circuit reversed
the judgment, ruling that the taxpayer was permitted to liquidate or refrain
from liquidating her security for whatever purposes she thought most profit-
able, including the reduction of her taxes.
14
The Second Circuit's reasoning was based on the premise that the existence
of security prevents a nonbusiness debt from being "entirely worthless" in a
year when the unsecured portion is uncollectible.'0 The court relied on several
business debt cases,' 6 which indicate that if an otherwise worthless debt is
covered by some security, the debt is not wholly worthless, but the taxpayer
may claim the optional partial deduction.'1 The Second Circuit also indicated
a desire to correlate tax law with commercial law on the subject of security.' 8
Commercial law permits a creditor whose debtor has defaulted to refrain from
selling his security as he sees fit as long as the value of the security is less than
the amount of the debt.' 9 The court disapproved a Tax Court decision which
introduced in the Revenue Act of 1942 was made retroactive to December 31, 1938, 56
STAT. 822 (1942), the Loewis must have believed until 1942 that their bad debt deduction
would be offset against ordinary income. BARTON, FE.aA INcOmE, ESTATE AND GIFT
TAX LAWS CORRLATED 74-76 (9th ed. 1944). The Commissioner's error was of no signifi-
cance in this case because the net income of the Loewis from 1938-41 never exceeded
$10,154.24 annually. Brief for Appellees, app. pp. 30a-41a, Loewi v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 627
(2d Cir. 1956).
13. Loewi v. Ryan, 55-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9445 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The government defended
the action on three grounds. First, it contended that no bona fide debt ever existed. Second,
it urged that assuming a valid debt, the collateral securing the obligation was taken in
satisfaction of the debt prior to 1944. Finally, the jury was asked to find that the debt, if
it ever existed, became worthless prior to 1944. The jury brought in a general verdict in
favor of the government.
The appellants based their appeal solely on claimed errors in the trial court's charge as
it related to the third ground. The charge complained of was as follows:
"However, if you find that the debts were secured, as I have instructed you, con-
sider the security with all the other factors I have mentioned in determining whether
the debts became worthless in 1944.
"And in connection, as I say, with whether the debt became worthless in 1944 I
charge you that the postponement of a bad debt deduction until the collateral is
applied to the debt cannot be permitted solely because of the existence of this col-
lateral. Such postponement must be shown to have been in good faith and bona fide
for a taxpayer."
Id. at 55,093.
14. 229 F.2d at 629 n.1. This ruling was based on Supreme Court decisions holding
the taxpayer's motive to be irrelevant in determining his tax liability. But see San Joaquin
Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 220, 227 (9th Cir. 1942).
15. 229 F.2d at 629.
16. Ibid. These and similar decisions are cited note 32 infra.
17. For discussion of the deduction for partial worthlessness, see note 3 supra.
18. 229 F.2d at 629.
19. RESTATEMENT, SEcURITY §§ 48, 52 (1941); OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 921-38, 991-95
(1951).
However, to follow that law in this context would open a very substantial loophole in
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would prevent deferring a bad debt deduction indefinitely by requiring the
taxpayer to take the deduction at the time the unsecured amount became hope-
lessly worthless. 20 "If that [result] is desired," reasoned the Second Circuit,
"there must be some change in the Act . . . or Regulations."' 21 Judge Frank,
who accepted the court's premise, dissented on the ground that a taxpayer
may refrain from foreclosing on security for any valid business reason, but
not tax reduction. Moreover, he would make the taxpayer's judgment in that
respect controlling, as long as the taxpayer acted in good faith.
22
Permitting a taxpayer to postpone the deduction because of the existence
of security is to allow him to withhold it in a low-income year and take the
claim when it inures to his greatest advantage. 23 Moreover, the reasoning of
the decision extends to business as well as to nonbusiness bad debts, and thus
would also permit shifting deductions from ordinary income.2 4 This privilege
the Code. When such loopholes have arisen, Congress has not hesitated to deviate from
commercial law in amending the Code. See Reiling, Developing a Law of Income Taxa-
tion, 32 TAXES 546, 566-68 (1954); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78 (grantors and
others treated as substantial owners) ; id. § 704(e) (family partnerships) ; id. § 1239 (gains
from sales between related parties). Nor have courts been bound by non-tax law. See
text at notes 47, 48 infra (constructive receipt).
20. Leopold Spingarn, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 498 (1948). In that case, the unsecured
portion of a $400,000 debt was uncollectible at the time of the debtor's death in 1937 al-
though the creditor held $80,000 worth of collateral which had been pledged as security for
the debt. The creditor did not liquidate the collateral until 1943, at which time he claimed
a bad debt deduction for the unsecured portion. He argued that the debt was not and could
not have been determined to be worthless until the sale of all the collateral. But the tax
court replied that a taxpayer "cannot be permitted to hold collateral indefinitely and take
a deduction as it suits his fancy when the debt in excess of the collateral was hopelessly
bad in prior years." Id. at 501.
21. 229 F.2d at 629.
22. Id. at 630. Judge Frank reasoned that it was not Congress' intent that a taxpayer
have the choice of the taxable year in which to deduct a loss since the statute provides a
definite period in which bad debts must be deducted, i.e., "the taxable year" within which
they become worthless.
23. Under Loewn, it would be possible to plan manipulation at the time a nonbusiness
debt was made. Nonbusiness debts are always suspect; frequently they are merely a guise
for gifts to relatives and friends made with no intention of repayment. See Note, 65 YALE
L.J. 247 n.4 (1955). Thus, the "loan" can be secured by some collateral of little more
than nominal value. This allows the creditor to choose any year in which to liquidate the
security. In addition, the fact that some security was given also serves to give a gift the
semblance of a valid loan. See note 1 supra. Although the majority makes clear that the
security must be of "substantial value," 229 F.2d at 629, this test introduces difficult ques-
tions of proof in individual cases. Furthermore, the security need not be given when the
loan is made. Thus in Loewi, the last pledge of stock was made in 1935, two years before
the taxpayer admitted she knew the debt was probably uncollectible. See note 10 stupra
and accompanying text.
24. The statutory language in regard to worthlessness is identical for both types of
debts, I T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(a) (1), (d) (1) (B), and the court recognized the
similarity of treatment by referring to business debt cases for support. 229 F.2d at 629
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of manipulating deductions is out of step with frequent holdings that, in the
absence of statutory authority, events of tax significance may not be shuffled to
and fro between taxable periods.25 Federal income tax statutes have been con-
sistently drawn with the purpose of fixing, so far as is practicable, the precise
year in which a deduction must be claimed.26 That year is the one which
causes taxable income to coincide most closely with preferred accounting prin-
ciples.27 In particular, the decision is inconsistent with the tenor of the bad
Judge Frank also understood the majority to agree that their ruling applied to business
bad debts secured by collateral. Id. at 631.
Some language in the opinion indicates that the decision would not apply to business
debts. Id. at 629-30. Presumably, because a "business" taxpayer may deduct any worth-
less portion of a debt, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166(a) (2), he would not be allowed to
postpone a deduction solely for tax advantage. However, the deduction for partial worth-
lessness is optional and once a taxpayer has chosen not to exercise the option, the Loewi
conclusion that collateral prevents complete worthlessness seems as compelling in the
"business" as in the "nonbusiness" cases. This has been the conclusion reached by the
business debt cases prior to Loewi. See note 32 infra.
25. In Avery v. Commissioner, 22 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1927), the court held that to permit
manipulation of the time for a bad debt deduction would defeat the intent and purpose of
the law. Stephenson v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 1930) ; Hiram R. Lloyd,
34 B.T.A. 301 (1936); Katharine H. Putnam, 31. B.T.A. 241, 244-45 (1934). U.S. Treas.
Reg. 118,§ 39.23(k)-1 (d) (1951).
In non-bad debt cases the Supreme Court has recognized the principle. Burnet v. San-
ford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 363 (1931) (reporting income and losses) ; Virginian
Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523, 525 (1943) (depreciation).
"[Nleither income nor deduction may be accelerated or postponed from one taxable
year to another in order to reflect the ultimate result of a business transaction." Harrold
v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002, 1003 (4th Cir. 1951.).
See MAGILL, TAXABLE INcomE 245-54 (rev. ed. 1945).
26. Belser v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1949). See INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 461 (a).
For discussion of statutory attempts to block postponing the receipt of income see
Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1947). For discussion of
congressional reaction to shifting of losses suffered on performing a contract see Burnet
v. Sanford & Brooks Co., supra note 25. The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 24(b), (c), as amended, 67 STAT. 617 (1953) (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 267) ".... was to put an end to the right of tax-payers to choose ... their
own time for realizing taxlosses . M." cWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 700
(1947).
When Congress has wanted to permit special treatment for problems of fluctuating in-
come it has done so specifically. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 453 (installment sales),
1301-04 (lump sum compensation).
27. Congress has indicated that "... it is essential that the income tax laws be brought
into harmony with generally accepted accounting principles. . . ." S. REP. No. 372, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955) ; see also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1954) ; H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1954).
INT. RE . CODE OF 1954, § 446 directs that computation of taxable income be based on
the taxpayer's accounting methods except where departure is necessary to reflect income
clearly.
For examples of successful efforts to eliminate divergences between tax and business
accounting, and suggestions as to future improvements, see Mills, Tax Accounting and
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debt section which would deny taxpayers the opportunity to choose the year
in which to take the deduction. The Code was amended in 1942 to make the
test of bad debt worthlessness an objective one of worthlessness in fact. 2 8
Prior to that time a taxpayer could properly claim a deduction in the year in
which he ascertained an indebtedness to have become worthless, regardless of
the year in which it actually became uncollectible.2 9 The "good faith" require-
ment of Judge Frank 30 is also unsuitable. It employs a subjective test similar
to the one Congress rejected. Moreover, it would not be an effective barrier
against tax avoidance because of the wide area of discretion it would leave to
the taxpayer.31
Business Accounting. Present Status and Remaining Differences, 8 NAT'L TAx J. 69
(1955) ; Lasser and Peloubet, Tax Accounting v. Commercial Accounting, 87 J. AccouNT-
ANcY 279 (1949) ; Edelman, Is Income Tax Accounting "Good" Accounting Practice?,
24 TAXES 112 (1946). Accounting principles would require a debt to be written off at the
time the debt becomes uncollectible. Similarly, if a debt becomes partially worthless, the
loss should be recognized pro tanto at that time. See PATON, ESSENTIALS OF AccouNrING
415 (1938).
28. Redman v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1946) ; Cittadini v. Commissioner,
139 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1943) ; Watson v. Fahs, 120 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Fla. 1954). "Debts
which become worthless within the taxable year" was substituted for "debts ascertained
to be worthless and charged off within the taxable year." BARTON, op. cit. supra note 12,
at 74-75; H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, 76 (1942) ; S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90 (1942) ; 88 CoNG. REc. 6377 (1942) ; Hearings Before the Senate
Finance Committee, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 51, 692, 1612 (1942).
The Revenue Act of 1942 also extended the period for claims for refund or credit from
three to seven years. The three year period was objectionable because in many instances
where there was a disallowance of a deduction taken in the wrong year the statute of
limitations barred amendment of the return for the allegedly proper year. The seven year
statute of limitations does not apply to partially worthless debts. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6511 (d).
29. BARTON, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 74-75.
In addition, the debt had to be charged within that period. Ibid. Many courts held that
even if a reasonably prudent person would have believed a debt actually became worthless
in a given year, the taxpayer might deduct the debt in a later year, provided that in good
faith it was then that he first ascertained the fact of worthlessness. Harris v. Commis-
sioner, 140 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Jones v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1930).
Other courts, to avoid the frequent coincidence of a taxpayer's judgment of worthlessness
and a year of high income, disregarded the element of good faith and insisted that the
taxpayer ascertain worthlessness in the year that a reasonable man would have done so.
Reading Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Curtis v. Helvering, 110 F.2d
1014 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Sabath v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1938); Avery v.
Commissioner, 22 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1927).
30. Loewi v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 627, 630 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion); see Leo-
pold Spingarn, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 498 (1948).
31. It would not be difficult for the taxpayer to allege non-tax motives for postponing
liquidation, such as an anticipated rise in the value of security. Whether or not this "busi-
ness reason" actually motivated the postponement would require inquiry into the state of
the creditor's mind. But even though the postponement is for bona fide reasons, it would
seem preferable to require the deduction when an ascertainable loss has occurred: i.e.,
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The authorities relied on by Loewi are not compelling. The secured business
debt cases, all decided by lower and intermediate courts, consider that the exis-
tence of security causes an otherwise wholly bad debt to be only partially worth-
less. 32 Although this is a possible interpretation of what Congress envisaged as
a partial loss, it is by no means a necessary one. The partial deduction was in-
troduced to enable taxpayers to reflect accurately their net income for the tax-
able year.3 3 This was to be achieved by permitting a creditor to deduct the
uncollectible portion of a debt at the time it became worthless even though his
debtor had some assets which might later be available to satisfy the rest of the
debt.3 4 A situation clearly within the scope of the partial loss enactment occurs
when the debtor becomes bankrupt and the creditor must wait until a later
tax year for the trustee's distribution.35 In this type of situation, the Code
recognizes that the creditor cannot control the time for fixing the loss com-
pletely; to require him to postpone the deduction until the debt became wholly
worthless would not reflect economic reality. However, at the time Congress
when the worthlessness of the unsecured portion of the debt is established. See note 27
supra. At this point it should be noted, however, that if the debt were evidenced by a
corporate security, which was secured by collateral, the bad debt section would be in-
applicable, see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(e), although the same reasoning might con-
ceivably apply.
32. Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1953) ; Old Colony
Trust Associates v. Hasset, 150 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1945) ; Marcus Boyd, 4 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 293 (1945); Cyrus S. Eaton, P-H 1942 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 42,282; John H. Wood
Co., 46 B.T.A. 895 (1942) ; Howard W. Georger, P-H 1941 B.T.A. Mem. Dec. ff 41,376;
Kessler Oil & Gas Co., 41 B.T.A. 31 (1940). A taxpayer is not compelled to take a de-
duction for a debt which is only partially bad. See note 3 supra.
Several of these cases also reasoned that until collateral was sold the uncollectible
balance of a debt could not in any way be ascertained. But it has been held not necessary
that collateral actually be sold or disposed of as a prerequisite to a partial bad debt deduc-
tion. Ross v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1934) ; Dominion Nat'l Bank, 26 B.T.A.
421 (1932). Furthermore, when property is accepted in payment of a debt, deduction of the
excess of the debt over the value of the property is allowable only in the year that the
property is received, and not in a subsequent year when it is sold. Fairmount Foundry,
Inc., 42 B.T.A. 1087 (1940) ; Rev. Rul. 30, 2 Cums. BULL. 138 (1920). It is frequently
necessary to determine the fair market value of property. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1.954,
§§ 1014, 1015 (property acquired from decedent or by gift) ; PEARCE, INCOME TAX FUNDA-
MENTALs 33-34 (1937); Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954);
McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Note, 64 YALE L.J. 269 (1954)
(valuation of employee stock options). It would not therefore appear difficult to subtract
the value of the collateral from the amount of the debt. See note 50 infra and accompany-
ing text.
33. John E. Saddler, 2 B.T.A. 1305, 1306 (1925) ; H.R. REI. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1921) ; 61 CONG. REc. 5201, 5289, 5939-41 (1921) ; PAUL, STUDIEs iN FEDERAL
TAXATION 247 (1937).
34. IN. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(a) (2); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k)-1(c)
(1951).
35. Grant G. Simmons, 4 T.C. 478 (1944) ; H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1921) ; 61 CONG. REC. 5201, 5289, 5939-41 (1921) ; PAUL, op. cit. supra note 33, at 247.
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enacted this relief provision there was no indication that when the unsecured
portion of a secured debt became bad a deduction would be denied under the
wholly worthless provision. Indeed, as the Loewi case illustrates, when the
taxpayer does have control over the time when the loss may be fixed,30 to
permit him to postpone the deduction serves only a tax avoidance purpose.
The secured business debt cases are unsound as precedent on yet another
ground. All but two of them were decided under the Code as it existed before
the 1942 amendments when taxpayers were allowed considerable latitude in
determining the year in which a debt became worthless.37 Under that tax
policy it was not unreasonable to permit secured creditors to postpone their
deductions because the security had not been liquidated. The remaining two
cases relied solely on the earlier decisions without mention of the statutory
change.38 The substantial changes in the bad debt section in 1942, introducing
an objective standard of worthlessness, would justify the Loewi court in dis-
regarding these cases.3 9
It might also be suggested that section 39.23(k)-1(c) of the Treasury
Regulations, discussing the effect of collateral, is opposed to treating a secured
debt as wholly worthless until the security is liquidated.40 But the pertinent
36. The secured creditor already has dominion over the security since he has possession
if the property is pledged, RESTATEMENT, SECURITY §§ 4-8 (1941); Isaacs, Pledge, 12
ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 166 (1934), title if the security is a mortgage, or equitable ownership in
any other method of transfer to secure a debt, OsBoRNE, MORTGAGES 32-34, 54-59, 306-15,
406-10 (1951) ; Sanborn, Lien, 9 ENcYc. Soc. ScI. 456 (1933) ; Sturges, Mortgage, 11
ENCYc. Soc. Sci. 32 (1933). In some cases the secured creditor will not have an oppor-
tunity to sell the security at a reasonable price because of economic conditions. However,
it is difficult to recognize this factor without also introducing the creditor's subjective
detemrninations of what constitute business reasons. See note 31 supra and accompanying
text.
37. See note 29 supra.
38. Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1953) and Marcus
Boyd, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 293 (1945).
39. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
40. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k)-1(c) (1951).
Section 39.23(k) -3(a) of the Regulations might also be considered to imply that the
deduction need not be taken until the time of the sale of mortgaged or pledged property.
"If mortgaged or pledged property is lawfully sold ... for less than the amount
of the debt, and the portion of the indebtedness remaining unsatisfied after such sale
is wholly or partially uncollectible, the mortgagee or pledgee may deduct such
amount... as a bad debt for the taxable year in which it has become wholly worth-
less or is charged off as partially worthless."
However, the regulation might well be interpreted to apply only if the sale is conducted in
the year in which the unsecured portion becomes wholly worthless. The tense of the phrase
"has become" would be incorrect if the draftsman were referring only to past worthless-
ness (should have used "became") or if he were referring to the future (should have used
"becomes") but is appropriate if the year of sale is the same as the year in which the un-
collectible deficiency has become worthless. "Has become" was introduced into the Regu-
lations in 1942 at the same time that the 1942 amendments to the Code were adopted to
make the text of bad debt worthlessness objective. T.D. 5234, 1943 CuMi. BULL. 119, 125.
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portion of the section is ambiguous.4 1 It concludes "In determining whether
a debt is worthless in whole or in part the Commissioner will consider ... the
value of the collateral, if any, securing the debt and the financial condition of
the debtor .... ,420 While it might be argued that this sentence supports the
theory that the existence of collateral prevents an otherwise worthless debt
from being wholly worthless, it is equally capable of referring only to the deter-
mination of the amount of a deduction. The regulation does not appear to
have been cited for either interpretation.
43
To hold that a debt becomes wholly worthless in the year the unsecured
portion becomes uncollectible would be consistent with the language of the
Code. The "debt which becomes worthless" 44 could be interpreted to refer to
the unsecured portion of a secured debt since it is the only amount that can
ever be deducted. 4 At the time this is uncollectible the debt is worthless for
tax purposes, and the deduction should be required. Only then would the
amount of the deduction be considered. For this purpose the value of the
security is taken into account.
Another approach which the Loewi court could have taken would have been
to find a constructive purchase of the security by the taxpayer at the time the
unsecured portion of the debt became uncollectible. 46 The value of the securi-
ty would be applied to reduce the indebtedness leaving the remainder of the
debt unsecured, uncollectible and deductible only in that taxable year. While
there is no support for a constructive purchase theory in the Code, the inau-
guration of such a doctrine by the courts to close a loophole in tax law is not
without precedent. Thus, in deciding when a cash basis taxpayer is to report
income, judges refuse to be bound by a strict reading of the Code's provision
This ambiguity cannot be solved by reference to the judicial decisions since no court
appears to have construed the phrase.
41. Courts have disregarded Treasury Regulations which were ambiguous or in con-
flict with judicial statutory interpretation. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
39, 48-49 (1939) ; Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16, 20 (1932).
42. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k)-1(c) (1951). The wording of this sentence has
not been altered since its insertion into the Regulations in 1921
43. Of the cases cited in note 32 supra, and other relevant cases, only Industrial Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1953) mentions § 39.23(k)-1(c), and that
opinion makes no particular reference to the sentence in question.
44. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(a) (1).
45. There is no loss for the portion of the debt which is secured and by definition, if
the value of the security diminishes, the unsecured portion of the debt increases.
"Consequences cannot alter statutes, but may help to fix their meaning." Cardozo, J.,
in In the Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 91, 116 N.E. 782, 785, rearg. denied, 221 N.Y.
667, 117 N.E. 1083 (1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918).
46. It is possible that the taxpayer could not foreclose on the security even though the
debt were actually worthless. For example, the principal indebtedness may not yet be in
default and without an acceleration clause, the creditor would be unable to liquidate the
collateral. Since, in this case, the creditor would have no control over the time for fixing
the loss, the constructive purchase theory would be inapplicable. See text at notes 33-36
su pra.
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that income items be included in the year in which they are "received by the
taxpayer. 4 7 Rather, to prevent taxpayers from selecting the year in which
they will report income already earned, courts apply the judicially created doc-
trine of constructive receipt.
48
Under either of the proposed alternatives to the Second Circuit's decision
in Loewi, security held by a nonbusiness debt taxpayer should generally be
subject to the capital gains and losses subchapter of the Code. 49 The basis of
the security would be its value at the time the unsecured portion of the debt
became uncollectible. When the nonbusiness debt taxpayer sells the security
any increase in value realized by him over its basis will result in a capital
gain, and any decrease in value, in a capital loss. 50 Hence, the taxpayer would
eventually be entitled to the identical capital loss deduction he received under
the Loezi decision, but he would not be able to select the most advantageous
year in which to take the deduction.
However, in the hands of a business debt taxpayer security should not gen-
erally be considered a capital asset for purposes of capital gains and losses
treatment. The Code definition of a capital asset,51 as interpreted by the
47. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 451(a).
48. "Not recognizing constructive receipt of income as income realized would open the
door to fraud by leaving it within the power of the taxpayer to reduce income to posses-
sion at such time as would best suit his taxation purposes. Such right of selection does
not rest with the taxpayer, nor does it find approval in the cases." Loose v. United States,
74 F.2d 147, 150 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Hedrick v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1946).
See, generally, Comment, Constructive Receipt: When Must the Taxpayer Pay?, 45 ILL.
L. Rxv. 77 (1950).
49. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-41.. Section 1221 defines a capital asset as any
"property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business)..."
except property listed in a series of exclusionary clauses. These clauses now cover almost
every type of property held by a taxpayer in connection with his trade or business. Since
a "'non-business' debt means a debt other than-
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a tax-
payer's trade or business; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's
trade or business,"
id. § 166(d) (2), security for a nonbusiness debt would ordinarily be a capital asset. In
the rare case where the security is used in the creditor's trade or business, its disposition
will lead to ordinary gain or loss treatment.
50. Id. § 1222.
If, at the time of sale, the value of the security exceeds the uncollected portion of the
debt plus interest and selling expenses, the excess must be turned over to the debtor, RE-
STATEMIENT, SECURITY § 49 (1941) ; OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 1005 (1951), and does not con-
stitute gain to the creditor.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 111, treating recovery of bad debts, should not be applicable
to any gain to the creditor since for tax purposes the creditor would be treated as owner
of the collateral; in that view the gain would not represent a recovery. If the gain were
treated as a recovery of the bad debt and § 111 held applicable, it would reduce the amount
of the gain to the extent that the bad debt deduction taken in a prior year did not result
in tax benefit. See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1952).
51. See note 49 supra.
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Supreme Court in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,52 excludes
property held incident to a taxpayer's regular business, rather than as an in-
vestment.53 Prior to default, a business debt taxpayer holds security as an
integral part of his business operation; he retains it after the unsecured portion
of the debt becomes worthless only if there is hope of thereby reducing the
amount of his loss on the business debt.5 4 If the security is not treated as a
capital asset, a subsequent sale by the taxpayer will result in ordinary gain or
loss to offset or increase the ordinary loss deduction taken at the time the un-
secured portion of the debt became uncollectible. The business debt taxpayer
will ultimately receive the identical total deduction he receives under the Loewi
interpretation of the Code, with the opportunity to manipulate the time of
the deduction eliminated. If the security is held to represent an investment by
the taxpayer, and thus to be a capital asset, its sale following a rise in value
will offset capital gain against the ordinary loss of the bad debt deduction; if
the value falls, part of the taxpayer's loss will be capital instead of ordinary.
Assuming the correctness of a court's classification of security as an invest-
ment asset,55 these results will accurately reflect the business transactions that
will have occurred: bad debt deduction from ordinary income when the un-
secured portion of the debt became worthless, investment in the security by
the creditor in lieu of liquidation, and subsequent capital gain or loss.
The possibility which Loewi creates for secured creditors to manipulate the
time for bad debt deductions could be readily eliminated if the Commissioner
would promulgate a new regulation covering secured bad debts. This regula-
tion should provide that: in the case of secured business or nonbusiness debts,
when the creditor is able to liquidate the security, the debt shall be treated as
having become worthless within the taxable year in which the surrounding
circumstances indicate that the unsecured portion of the debt is wholly worth-
less and uncollectible. 6 The amount of the deduction shall be the difference
52. 350 U.S. 46 (1955) ; Note, 65 YALE L.J. 401 (1956).
53. "Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of
a business be considered as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain or loss. The
preferential treatment provided by [the capital assets provisions] ... applies to transactions
in property which are not the normal source of business income. It was intended 'to relieve
the taxpayer from... excessive tax burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of capital
investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conversions.
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S., at 106 [1932]." Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,
supra note 52, at 52.
54. Several cases which seem to have anticipated Corn Products Refining Co. v. Com-
missioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), held that the cost of maintaining collateral following in-
solvency of the debtor may be deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 143 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1944); Dominion Nat'l Bank,
26 B.T.A. 421 (1932). However, if the collateral secures a non-business debt, the cost of
maintenance cannot be deducted as an expense. United States v. Mellinger, 228 F.2d 688
(5th Cir. 1956).
55. See Note, 65 YALE L.J. 401 (1956) for treatment of the classification question.
56. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k)-1(d) (1951).
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between the amount of the debt and the fair market value of the security at the
time the unsecured portion of the debt became wholly worthless. Thereafter
this fair market value will be considered the basis for the security, which will
be treated as property in the hands of the creditor. The proposed regulation
would not prevent partial deduction for a business debt whenever the un-
secured portion of the debt became partially worthless. Until a clarifying regu-
lation is adopted courts should read the existing Code and Regulations in the
light of the Supreme Court's statement that taxation "is an intensely practical
matter"5 7 and should render a solution that will preclude manipulation of de-
ductions by secured creditors.
57. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 212 (1930).
